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NEGOTIATED TRADE LIBERALIZATION under the auspices of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) has been the big
international economic story of the last sixty years. The GATT contained a dispute
settlement procedure (DSP) which proved to be of only spasmodic significance. The
Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, which established the WTO, significantly
changed this procedure in the hopes of increasing its use. These hopes, at least, have not
been frustrated.
But the recent vociferous (and sometimes violent) protests of environmentalists and social
activists have been motivated to a significant (and perhaps dominant) degree by the
decisions of the WTO DSP. This paper addresses, in such a context, the economic role of a
system of punishments and dispute settlement.
I. Introduction
The GATT/WTO trade liberalization has had to deal with numerous trade disputes between
individual countries, and the need to address these has produced a multilateral response.
These disputes—within the GATT DSP, outside of it, or within the WTO DSP—and the
response, can be summarized by the following stylized facts.
0 Punishments for alleged violations of past agreements have been delayed.3XQLVKPHQWV DQG ’LVSXWH 6HWWOHPHQW LQ 7UDGH $JUHHPHQWV 3DJH ￿
1Third countries with a vital interest in a matter under dispute between major countries sometimes sign on as
participants (the banana war between the US and the EU being a notable example). This can be the easiest way for
small countries to participate in the system.
A decision to utilize a DSP is in practice a decision to delay punishment until that procedure
has run its course. But, even when a DSP is not utilized, countries convinced that partners
have violated trade agreements have consistently chosen to negotiate first, and to threaten
punishments should the negotiations fail, rather than immediately to punish, and then to
cease the punishments should the negotiations succeed.
0 Trade disputes are inherently bilateral, not multilateral.
The direct participants to trade disputes (whether two or several), and only they, initiate the
disputes, force their timing, undertake negotiations to settle, and inflict punishments. This is
true even if the dispute is conducted within a multilaterally-established DSP.
1 Indeed, a
major function of such a system is to keep disputes bilateral by inducing aggrieved nations to
go before a panel of experts rather than to seek allies among third countries. This is not
necessarily a good thing: An insightful contribution by Maggi (1999) has shown that, in the
presence of strategic complementarities across governments imposing tariffs on the same
good, a multilateral DSP could enlarge aggregate punishment beyond that obtainable as a
sum of bilateral punishments, allowing the negotiation of more multilateral liberalization.
0 A formal DSP was created and continues to evolve.
The procedure was created years ago by the GATT, but the most important steps in its
evolution were the Uruguay Round changes mentioned above, embodied in the Dispute
Settlement Undertaking of that agreement.
0 The DSP of the WTO has almost always decided in favor of the complainant (C)
and, therefore, against the defendant (D).
Defendants clearly won only 2 of the first 44 decisions under the WTO system. Countries
file complaints only when confident (usually rightly) that their complaints are justified, and
not to acquire a “tough” reputation or to extract a nuisance value. This, too, has basically
been the case when a DSP has not been utilized: Countries have provoked confrontations
only when confident that concessions would result.
0 Defendants have (much more often than not, at least since the institution of the WTO
procedure) abided by the decisions of the DSP. But a number of important, highly:LOIUHG -￿ (WKLHU 3DJH ￿
visible, cases, involving major countries, have resulted in prolonged violations of
DSP decisions.
The decisions to abide have been widely viewed as evidence of the “success” of the WTO
DSP (unwelcome success, in the opinion of many environmentalists and social activists),
whereas the violations (notably the US–EU disputes on hormone-fed beef and bananas) have
been viewed as “failures” that threaten the viability of a “rules-based” system.
0 Punishments for alleged violations of past agreements have consistently been
commensurate with the violations (i.e., tit-for-tat).
This has been true regardless of whether the punishments, or threatened punishments, have
been unilateral or products of a DSP.
These are very special properties. What is the role of such a system? 
The theoretical literature on trade policy commonly models implementation of a trade
agreement as a repeated game. Each country weighs the short-term gain of deviating from its
commitment against the longer-term loss implied by the future imposition of punishing
trigger strategies by other countries. Thus the amount of liberalization obtainable is
determined by the severity of credible punishments. It is natural to ask first whether the
stylized facts described above can reasonably be thought of as corresponding to this theory.
There are difficulties with this. For one, negotiated tariff reductions do not in reality offer
a country the opportunity to get a significant jump on its partners by acting first. In today’s
world of instant communication, legislative transparency, and executive flexibility, it is not
true that deviation today must be punished in the future: Deviation today can be punished
today. Virtually no delay to retaliation means virtually no short-term gain from deviation, so
any credible punishment becomes very powerful as a disincentive. (An inability to retaliate
quickly was not always an unreasonable assumption: When James Madison introduced the
first US tariff bill in Congress in April 1789, he hoped to have it apply to the spring imports
shipped in ignorance of the tariff).
If, for whatever reason, retaliation is to be delayed, theory suggests that countries should
embrace strong punishments to sustain the most desirable outcomes supportable by credible
threats. But punishments for alleged violations of past agreements have consistently been
commensurate with the violation. That countries choose to delay punishment when they don't
have to, and then, having so chosen, employ such anemic punishments doesn’t correspond
well with the trigger strategy approach.
The same is arguably also true of the conclusion that the pace of liberalization is
determined by the severity of credible punishments. It appears to be determined instead by
trade-offs between interests, within countries, affected differently by that liberalization. 3XQLVKPHQWV DQG ’LVSXWH 6HWWOHPHQW LQ 7UDGH $JUHHPHQWV 3DJH ￿
This doesn’t imply that the trigger strategy approach is irrelevant to reality, just that its
domain of relevance does not include observed punishments and DSPs. Indeed, it suggests
the following hypothesis: Post war liberalization has been sustained by the fear that a break-
down in international cooperation would lead to a repetition of the experience of the 1930s
(Smoot-Hawley and all that), widely perceived as disastrous. This is certainly consistent with
attitudes common in the 1940s and 1950s, still lingering today. Under this interpretation, the
world has for about six decades succeeded in following an equilibrium path supported by
trigger strategies which, therefore, have never been observed. This presumes that all actual
trade disputes, punishments, and defiances of DSP rulings have been just features of the
equilibrium path.
It also suggests that the argument that actual liberalization seems to be determined by
internal political conflicts rather than by the credibility of trigger strategies need not be an
objection. The world has for six decades been gradually approaching a final static
equilibrium. It is the protection characterized by this equilibrium that will be determined by
trigger strategies, not the speed of approach to the equilibrium, determined by internal
political trade-offs.
Even those who regard such an explanation as far-fetched must concede that it cannot be
contradicted by historical experience.
But if this view is accepted, it still leaves open the following question. If observed DSPs
and punishments are not real-world counterparts to the trigger strategy theory, what role do
they play? Why are the stylized facts what they are? This paper proposes and investigates the
following answer. Trade agreements are necessarily incomplete contracts; the DSP and weak
punishments deal with that situation in a context in which individual countries sometimes
will be tempted to implement a trade related policy and sometimes will have their trade
influenced by a partner’s implementation of such a policy.
I investigate this hypothesis in a context in which countries repeatedly negotiate to lower
trade barriers, each negotiation building on those that preceded it (i.e., the GATT rounds). I
analyze a single round, presumably somewhere within the process. I am willing to accept the
above argument for the practical relevance of the trigger strategy theory by tacitly supposing
that a threat to retreat to a highly protectionist past (before the first round) supports the
equilibrium that I describe. But my concern is to describe that equilibrium.
Incomplete-contract problems arise because the subsequent state of the world is not
known when negotiations take place. Any agreement must reflect this. The most straightfor-
ward way to deal with it is to negotiate state-contingent agreements. But these have severe
limitations: The negotiation of state-invariant changes in recognized policy instruments has
become enormously complicated and time consuming. So, negotiated trade agreements
necessarily remain, by their very nature, incomplete contracts. This is implicitly acknowled-
ged in the GATT itself, where Articles XXII and XXIII allow response to a “nullification or:LOIUHG -￿ (WKLHU 3DJH ￿
2This literature includes Hungerford (1991), Ludema (2001), Kovenock and Thursby (1992), Maggi (1999),
Furusawa (1999), Bütler and Hauser (2000), and Rosendorff (2000). Staiger (1995) contains an insightful survey.
Related issues arise in Bagwell and Staiger (2001).
3Recall the most prominent trade disputes over the last 40 years: the “chicken war” between the US and the EC,
the US-EC dispute over EC policy toward oilseed production, US-EU disputes about U.S. hormone-fed beef and
genetically modified foods, the “banana war” between the US and the EU, complaints about US policies toward
Venezuelan oil and toward tuna caught in “dolphin-unfriendly” ways. In all these cases the policies of the accused
were common knowledge: It was their acceptability that was under dispute.
impairment” of concessions not necessarily the result of an explicit repudiation of a trade
agreement.
Trade agreements address a limited number of policy instruments that pertain directly to
trade, but governments care about economic outcomes, not about the instruments that can be
negotiated. And trade is one aspect of the general equilibrium that depends upon all econo-
mic instruments. So, ex post, governments will be doing things that influence trade and that
have not been explicitly addressed by trade agreements: a recipe for disagreement about the
constraints implied by those agreements.
Each country is aware, ex ante, that it may find itself, ex post, harmed by a policy that
some trading partner wishes to make. So the former will want a recognized punishment
procedure as a deterrent. But that country will also be aware, ex ante, that it might find, ex
post, itself in a position where it would be costly not to take some policy action that would
harm a partner. This is the reciprocal–conflict problem: Each country knows that it might
turn out to be either the accuser or the accused. Thus it is in no country's interest, ex ante, to
agree that, ex post, either the accuser should be unconstrained in its ability to punish or the
accused should be unconstrained in its ability to proceed without punishment. This generates
a role for a dispute settlement mechanism.
The above argument can motivate the use of either an explicit dispute-settlement mecha-
nism (as under the WTO) or an implicit agreement by countries not to punish without first
attempting to negotiate a solution and also spelling out in advance what punishments will be
used (as with the U.S. Section 301, and as when trade disputes under the GATT were not
submitted to GATT procedures). Furthermore, the theory that follows can also be interpreted
as an explanation of the practice of “withdrawal of equivalent concessions,” basic to the
GATT from its very beginning. In what follows there is no need to distinguish between these
alternatives; for concreteness I simply consider a formal dispute settlement mechanism.
Much of the theoretical literature on DSPs
2 assumes that trade policies of partners are
imperfectly observable and that the procedures serve to transmit information between agents.
But actual trade disputes generally proceed from the observation and address what to do
about these clearly observed policies.
3 Nor does a central purpose of such procedures seem
to be to resolve basic uncertainty about whether specific policies are or are not in fact
consistent with trade agreements. As pointed out above, WTO DSP decisions normally go
against the defendant. Indeed, in the more visible cases, the financial press routinely and3XQLVKPHQWV DQG ’LVSXWH 6HWWOHPHQW LQ 7UDGH $JUHHPHQWV 3DJH ￿
correctly predicts in advance which way decisions will go. So, to focus sharply on the fact
that trade agreements are incomplete contracts, I shall oversimplify a bit and assume away
both informational asymmetries and uncertainty about whether a policy under dispute does
in fact violate trade agreements. The purpose of a DSP will be (i) to supply a formal interna-
tional statement that such a policy is in fact a violation, (ii) to specify explicitly how it is in
violation, and (iii) to provide, if necessary, a neutral assessment of the “damage” caused by
that policy.
The use of such a mechanism cannot be costless. It implies that punishments must be
delayed, because the implementation of a controversial policy by some country cannot be
required to wait until the dispute settlement mechanism renders its verdict. The reason the
mechanism exists in the first place is that no one knows in advance what will come into
dispute: Trade agreements are incomplete contracts. So the only way to delay implementa-
tion is to require that this be automatically required for any policy action that is disputed, and
this would in effect give each country a temporary veto over every economic policy action of
every other country, hardly acceptable to anyone. This is my explanation for why countries
choose to delay punishment when they don’t have to.
II.  An Abstract Framework
I first provide a simple framework for the analysis that follows.
The background
Assume two goods, A and B, and two factors of production. In light of the stylized fact that
trade disputes are not inherently multilateral, I also assume 2 countries. One has a comparati-
ve advantage in A and the other in B; otherwise they are identical. Technology is neoclassi-
cal. Assume a succession of periods. Both factors are mobile between sectors across periods,
but immobile within each period. All consumers spend equally on both goods. 
Initially, each country has an historically given tariff t on all imports. This comes from a
highly protectionist past: I shall not investigate why the present is less protectionist. For
simplicity I suppose that this initial tariff is common to both countries. Also, factors in each
country are initially allocated between the two sectors. Governments negotiate changes in
initial tariffs; I shall not model the negotiations. The inter-sectoral immobility of factors
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less. When the governments negotiate changes in their tariffs they do not know the exact
state of the world that will pertain when those changes subsequently come into effect.
These two features—the tug of divergent special interests and the fact that agreements
must be reached before the environment to which they will apply is fully known—have
always been of paramount concern to trade negotiators. They must be addressed in any
useful model of negotiated liberalization.
At the close of any negotiations, the state of the world is revealed, governments imple-
ment tariff changes, and trade takes place. Once the period ends, factors become free to
move between sectors, and, once they have done so, history repeats itself, with the initial
tariffs for the new period equal to the final tariffs from the preceding period and with a new
generation of policymakers, taking history as given, ready to consider further tariff changes.
Government objectives
Following Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2001), I assume a government objective function
sensitive both to domestic relative prices and to the terms of trade. But I specify the functio-
nal form in several ways. For one, I suppose that domestic relative prices matter because
they influence the distribution of income between factors specific to the export sector and
those specific to the import sector, given the terms of trade, and I specify this distributional
concern. Also, I allow the possibility that a government may be confronted with the need to
decide upon a trade related policy: a policy that directly impacts its objective function but
that also influences trade.
Specifically, I use the following objective function.
where the three terms on the right reflect the implications, respectively, of distributional
concerns, the terms of trade, and a possible trade-related policy action. Rx and Rm denote the
real returns earned by factors specific to the export sector and to the import-competing sector
respectively. With trade liberalizations, ￿Rx > 0, ￿Rm < 0.  The parameter ￿ denotes the
weight the government attaches to Rx relative to Rm (presumably greater than unity if the
export sector is larger than the import-competing sector, as it will be here). The parameter
￿ > 0 captures the idea behind Corden’s (1997, pp 74-76) description of a conservative
social welfare function: Governments avoid policies that would cause a serious reduction in3XQLVKPHQWV DQG ’LVSXWH 6HWWOHPHQW LQ 7UDGH $JUHHPHQWV 3DJH ￿
4For ￿ > 0 appropriately to reflect a conservative social welfare function I need to choose units so that
–￿Rm/Rm > 1 for the policy change being considered. This observation was prompted by a comment from Rob
Feenstra. Hillman (1982) shows how Corden's concerns can be generated by a plausible political support function,
and applications of Corden's ideas to trade policy are found in Deardorff (1987), Brander and Spencer (1994), and
Ethier (1998a, b).
5I conjecture that the political externality is far more relevant to reality but that the terms-of-trade externality is
more “politically correct” among trade theorists. So take your choice.
the income of any interest group.
4 I accordingly refer to ￿ as the Corden sensitivity. Here
￿MA = (￿XD – ￿MD)/X , the excess, at initial world prices, of the direct amount by which
the tariff reduction would raise foreign demand for home exports over the direct amount it
would raise home demand for imports (in terms of exportables), as a proportion of the initial
trade volume. This can be called the net exchange of market access. The parameter  , ~ m
called the terms-of-trade sensitivity, reflects the impact  ￿MA will produce on the terms of
trade (the inverse of the familiar Marshall-Lerner term) multiplied by the importance the
government attaches to this. The parameter s indexes the (currently unknown) state of the
world that will exist when the new tariff levels are in effect, and a denotes a policy variable
determined after s is revealed (more on this later).
As Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2001) aptly note, the first term on the right in my objective
function, corresponding to internal distributional concerns, can be controlled unilaterally
whereas manipulating the second term involves international spillovers: Our terms of trade is
also our partner’s terms of trade. Thus it is only the second consideration—a terms of trade
externality— that can motivate trade agreements. I have two comments. First, the third term
of my objective function also corresponds to an international externality, but the point of
departure of this paper is that it is not possible to negotiate directly about it. Second, an
earlier paper, Ethier (1998b), used an objective function that incorporated the second term on
the right above but that based it on political externalities between countries rather that on
terms of trade externalities. Unlike the earlier paper, for the issues addressed in the two
country model of this paper, it doesn’t matter at all whether the negotiable externality
between the two governments is political or terms-of-trade in origin: The reader is invited to
take whichever interpretation he or she finds more congenial.
5
Unilateralism and reciprocity
Ignore the trade-related action for the moment, and consider a unilateral reduction
 in its tariff by a single country i. At unchanged world prices, the home () () t i tt =- + ￿ /1
relative price of imports falls by the amount of the tariff decrease, so that ￿Rx > 0, ￿Rm < 0,
and ￿MA = – ￿-iMi < 0, where ￿ denotes the home price elasticity of import demand and Mi:LOIUHG -￿ (WKLHU 3DJH ￿
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the initial volume of imports. Define a liberalization as reciprocal if accompanied by foreign
liberalizations that imply ￿MA = 0. Thus the second term of the governmental objective
function vanishes. The following is immediate.
Proposition 1 A government will never liberalize unilaterally, with a large enough
Corden sensitivity ￿ and terms of trade sensitivity .  However, it will always accept ~ m
a sufficiently small reciprocal liberalization that implies ￿￿Rx/Rx + ￿Rm/Rm > 0. It
will never accept a move to free trade, provided that the Corden sensitivity ￿ is suffici-
ently large.
Reciprocity neutralizes concern about market access, rendering the magnitude of   irrele- ~ m
vant. In what follows I assume that the above conditions are fulfilled: Governments will not
unilaterally liberalize, but they wish to negotiate reciprocal liberalizations that do not go all
the way to free trade. It is easy to specify bargaining rules that imply equal gains and diffi-
cult to specify plausible rules that imply unequal gains: I assume all agreements feature
reciprocal liberalization. I also assume that, because of pre-existing countervailing-duty
laws, trade cannot be subsidized: Tariffs are constrained to be nonnegative.
The optimal reciprocal rate of liberalization
Consider next the rate of reciprocal liberalization that both governments would, in the
absence of trade related actions, regard as optimal: the optimal reciprocal rate of liberaliza-
tion. To this end, rewrite the objective function as follows.
Under present assumptions, a liberalization at the rate - implies the following.
where -* denotes the partner country’s liberalization. Substituting these terms into the
political support function and defining the transformation   gives the ff mm
gg ==
++ 22
11 ~ , ~
following.3XQLVKPHQWV DQG ’LVSXWH 6HWWOHPHQW LQ 7UDGH $JUHHPHQWV 3DJH ￿￿




















where r = 2￿
1/￿. The value of - = -* that maximizes 1, the optimal reciprocal rate of libera-
lization, is therefore:
The optimal rate of liberalization can be interpreted as that rate which would be optimal for
all governments were trade agreements complete contracts.
III.  A Model of A Dispute Settlement Procedure
I now present a model of a DSP motivated by the earlier considerations. First, I must modify
the sequence of events within each period to reflect the incomplete-contract nature of trade
agreements and to include the operation of a DSP.
Trade related actions
Suppose that, ex post, some country may determine an action, a, which directly influences
that government’s level of political support and also affects that country’s willingness to
import. I am especially concerned with three types of uncertainty to which such an action
would be subject ex ante. 1 Uncertainty (or complete ignorance) about what actual policy
situation (environmental issues, health or safety concerns, etc., etc.) might give rise to such a
potential action. 2 Uncertainty about the identity of the country in which the situation might
emerge. 3 Uncertainty about the extent to which the potential action might be trade-related.
To focus sharply on these concerns, I shall assume away all other sources of uncertainty.:LOIUHG -￿ (WKLHU 3DJH ￿￿
The first aspect is incorporated in the requirement that the trade agreement be an in-
complete contract. Next, I suppose that exactly one issue will arise and that it will confer an
opportunity for a trade related action on one country or the other, with an equal probability
(½) of either outcome.
In general, a trade-related action by some country may or may not be welcomed by its
partners. But this paper concerns trade disputes. Consequently, I assume that such actions are
always unwelcome: They cause the country undertaking the action to display more protec-
tion rather than less.
Specifically, I assume that implementing an action at the level a (￿0) affects the coun-
try’s demand for imports in the same way as would an increase in its tariff in the proportion
￿a. Thus the trade-related action in effect reduces the country’s liberalization from the
negotiated rate - to the rate - – ￿a. The parameter ￿ is a measure of how trade-related the
action is: higher values of ￿ correspond to more trade-relatedness. Furthermore, indepen-
dently of its effect on the country’s trade, the action has a net direct effect on the govern-
ment’s political support in the amount ￿(a). When a trade agreement is being negotiated, the
value of ￿ is not yet known but has an expected value of unity.
I assume, for simplicity, that the form of the function ￿ is known at the time of negotia-
tions. In particular, ￿(0) = 0 and ￿ is strictly convex, increasing at a decreasing rate with
￿u ￿ 0, reaching a maximum at a = aOUA. Interpret aOUA as the optimal unilateral action: the
action the government would take in the absence of trade consequences.
The sequence of events
Each period now consists of the following sequence of events.
1 Countries negotiate and then implement a reciprocal rate of liberalization -, and they also
determine a DSP.
2 One country is then presented with the opportunity to make a trade related action a not
explicitly covered by the trade agreement, and this country (the potential defendant)
determines a.
3 The trading partner (the potential complainant) then utilizes the DSP.
4 A fixed adjudication time is required for the DSP to reach a determination. During this
time, the defendant continues with its action and no punishment is implemented.3XQLVKPHQWV DQG ’LVSXWH 6HWWOHPHQW LQ 7UDGH $JUHHPHQWV 3DJH ￿￿
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5 The DSP renders a decision for the complainant, and the defendant must then decide
whether to abide by the decision or to defy it. If it decides to abide, it sets a = 0, the
sequence comes to an end, and the period runs its course.
6 If the defendant decides to violate the DSP decision, the complainant retaliates with trade
restrictions proportional to the trade effects of the action a. The degree of proportionality
is fixed by the trade agreement. The sequence now comes to an end and the period runs its
course.
Possible outcomes
The objective functions of the governments of the potential defendant (D) and the potenti-
al complainant (C) are as follows.
Here, - is negotiated before it is known which country will be D and which will be C, and
before the magnitude of ￿ is known. After these are revealed, D chooses a. These expres-
sions are valid before the DSP decision is reached.
If D complies with the DSP decision, a becomes equal to zero in the above expressions. If
D refuses to comply and C punishes, the expressions become:
where ’ denotes the degree of proportionality for punishment allowed by the DSP.
For the period as a whole, the total value of each government’s objective function is a
weighted average of its value when the DSP is proceeding and its value after that procedure
has run its course. Let ￿ (1 ￿￿ ￿ 0) denote the weight given to the former and 1 – ￿ that
given to the latter. ￿ is determined by the discount factor (which I assume exogenous and
fixed) and by the amount of time allowed the DSP to do its business.:LOIUHG -￿ (WKLHU 3DJH ￿￿
6That C invokes the DSP rather than punishing immediately can be thought of as a feature of the equilibrium path
tacitly supported by trigger strategies.
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I can now describe the values of the objective functions of the two governments over the
period as a whole. i If the DSP is not invoked or finds in favor of D they are given by (3)
above. ii If the DSP finds for C and D abides they are as follows.
Here aJ denotes the action D takes during the adjudication phase.
iii If the DSP finds for C, D refuses to comply and continues to violate, and C implements a
punishment strategy we have:
In light of one of the stylized facts (“The DSP of the WTO has almost always decided in
favor of the complainant and, therefore, against the defendant”), I shall assume away case i,
that is, the DSP will always find for C. As mentioned above, use of the DSP implies that
punishments will be delayed.
6 Goals of the subsequent analysis include delineating when D
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IV.  The Base Case
The basic ideas of this paper are best illustrated by a special base case, which arises with two
further assumptions, to be subsequently relaxed. i The DSP is fast enough so that govern-
ments give little weight to what happens before a decision is reached: ￿ = 0. ii The degree of
trade-relatedness is known beforehand: ￿ = 1.
Under these circumstances, if D refuses to abide by the DSP ruling, the government
objective functions reduce to:
Consider first D's choice of a, given - and ’. This is determined by the first order condition
01
D/0a = 0, which reduces to
If ￿1 does not exceed a critical positive value, this expression can be solved for a(-, ’)
possessing the following properties.
Now turn to the negotiation stage. Assume each government wants to maximize the expected
value of its objective function. Since each government has equal probability of turning out to
be D or C, both governments share a common ex ante objective equivalent to maximizing
the sum 1
D + 1
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Substituting, and setting  because D will subsequently choose a optimally, fa
D = 0















choice of a requires that ￿1(a) = 0, that is, that a = aOUA. Thus the solution of the negotiation
phase plus D’s choice of a is given by the following.
So, commensurate punishment (’ = 1) emerges endogenously. This can be regarded as a
response to the reciprocal-conflict problem, as suggested above. But it does more than that.
It ensures that the ultimate implications of D’s actions on protection are reciprocal, which in
turn allows the governments to negotiate an agreement that will allow the country that turns
out to be D to implement the optimal unilateral action and both governments to experience
the optimal reciprocal liberalization. 
Note, also, that this trade agreement ensures that D will in fact take the action aOUA rather
than no action at all: the latter would cause D to experience more liberalization than desired








reach a trade agreement that guarantees that the country that turns out to be D will in fact
defy a negative ruling by the DSP.
Proposition 2 If no weight is given to the adjudication phase and if the degree of trade
relatedness is known with certainty, the negotiated trade agreement will feature
commensurate punishment, will induce D to violate the DSP, and will deliver, ex post,
both the optimal degree of liberalization and the optimal unilateral action for D.
Consider in this light the hormone-fed beef case, widely regarded as a “failure” of the
WTO system and as a threat to a “rules-based” international order for trade policy. An
alternative interpretation might go as follows. “If governments thought that trade agreements
would prevent them from responding to unforeseen deep political pressures of this sort (from
the EU viewpoint), they would never sign on to those agreements in the first place. If they
thought that such pressures would allow their trade partners to depart from reciprocity, they
also would never sign on to such agreements in the first place. Under these circumstances,
the experience of the hormone-fed beef case is probably the best feasible outcome, from the
viewpoint of long term trade liberalization.” Rosendorff (2000) offers a related analysis in
which a DSP allows a country to “purchase” a release from its trade commitments, inducing
it to agree to more liberalization than it would do in the absence of such a release. Perdikis,
Kerr and Hobbs (2001) observe (p. 381), “It has always been recognized that for the WTO to
be politically acceptable there have to be provisions which allow governments to ignore their
WTO commitments when domestic pressure for protection becomes politically unmanage-
able.” In other words, violation of DSP decisions can be thought of as an extra-legal counter-
part, applying to a residual of unforeseen circumstances, to various GATT provisions (e.g.,
Articles XXII and XXIII) allowing the legal withdrawal of concessions.
Proposition 2 is, of course, consistent with this interpretation. But it also goes much
further, suggesting the possibility of optimality properties of current arrangements.
Though the base case solution involves commensurate punishment, one can enquire how
much added deterrence stronger punishments would provide. Define the elasticity of deter-
rence as
where D chooses a optimally, that is, to satisfy (7). Deterrence can be said to be strong,
uniform, or weak according as ) exceeds, equals, or falls short of unity. Strong deterrence
means that a higher ex ante punishment proportionality ’ will result, at unchanged -, in less
ex post punishment ’a, and so forth.
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Thus deterrence elasticity is enhanced by a high terms of trade sensitivity (￿￿) or optimal
rate of reciprocal liberalization (-ORL) and by a low willingness to protect (￿), optimal
unilateral action (aOUA), or low curvature (– ￿2) of the payoff from unilateral action.
V.  Beyond the Base Case: A Significant Adjudication Phase
The base case gives strong results, but at the cost of suppressing essential aspects of the
problem: the adjudication phase and the possibility of different degrees of trade relatedness
￿. I now consider the implications of these features, proceeding one step at a time. I start by
allowing a significant adjudication phase: ￿ > 0.
The adjudication phase
During the adjudication phase, C cannot punish D, so the respective objective functions,
during that period, are as follows.3XQLVKPHQWV DQG ’LVSXWH 6HWWOHPHQW LQ 7UDGH $JUHHPHQWV 3DJH ￿￿
(10)
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During the adjudication phase, the optimal action aJ(-) corresponding to each negotiated
liberalization is implicitly defined byD’s first order condition
This in turn implies that
Consider, initially, the trade agreement of the base case: - = -ORL + aOUA and ’ = 1. Then,
with ￿￿ > 0, the first order condition requires that aJ > aOUA. This reveals three influences of
the adjudication phase on the objective functions of the two governments.
First, by taking the trade related action without punishment, D’s objective function
increases by ￿￿aJ while C’s falls a like amount. This departure from reciprocity might well
induce ex post apoplectic outrage from C, but it has no direct ex ante effect since it does not
change the joint welfare of the two governments. It has an indirect effect, however, because
it induces D to set aJ higher than it otherwise would: aJ > aOUA implies that - – aJ < -ORL and
￿(aJ) < ￿(aOUA). Thus D experiences less effective liberalization than it would otherwise like,
and an excessive level of the action a, and this does reduce the joint welfare of the two
governments. This is also true of the third effect: because C cannot retaliate during the
adjudication phase, it experiences “excessive” liberalization at the negotiated rate. (Another
way of saying this is that the DSP causes the C government to behave during the adjudica-
tion phase as though it had a lower willingness to protect  (￿) than it actually does—aggre-
gate national welfare rises with the actual rate of liberalization).
The trade agreement
Next, take a step back to enquire whether setting ￿ > 0 would induce the two govern-
ments to reach a trade agreement different from that of the base case. The effect of a change:LOIUHG -￿ (WKLHU 3DJH ￿￿
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in - on the joint objective function during the adjudication phase, taking into account D’s
response in taking its optimal action aJ(-), is as follows.
With - close to -ORL + aOUA, the first term on the right-hand side will be positive and the
remaining two terms negative. For small values of ￿￿, aJ will not be much greater than aOUA,
so that the first term on the right will be dominated by the second, and the entire expression
is thus negative. An increase in ￿￿ will produce an increase in aJ, but it will magnify the
third term more than the first (see the Appendix), so the entire expression will remain
negative.
With the right-hand side negative, a small decrease in - below -ORL + aOUA will increase
the joint welfare of the two governments during the adjudication phase. This will have no
first-order effect on their joint welfare during the post-adjudication phase, where  -ORL + aOUA
is first-best. Thus it generates a net overall benefit.
Proposition 3  If the adjudication phase becomes of concern to the two governments
(i.e., if ￿ becomes positive) they will negotiate a trade agreement with less liberaliza-
tion than that of the base case. 
Intuitively, if - is reduced, D will lower aJ. This affects D in two ways: aJ falls back
toward aOUA, increasing the non-trade benefits of the action; aJ falls less than the reduction in
- itself so that - – aJ falls, further worsening the deficient realized liberalization experienced
by D. Thus, the reduction in the negotiated rate of liberalization induces D to give more
weight to the non-trade implications of the action, and less weight to the trade aspects,
during the adjudication phase. Finally, the reduction in - directly reduces the “excessive”
liberalization experienced by C during the adjudication phase, a clear benefit to the C go-
vernment at least.
Next turn to the implications of ￿ > 0 for the negotiated punishment factor ’. The size of
’ is irrelevant to the adjudication phase, but the fact that ￿ > 0 causes - to deviate from its
post-adjudication first-best value suggests that ’ may also deviate from its post-adjudication
first-best value (unity). The second equation in (8) above is the condition that ’ be set
optimally, from the ex ante point of view of each government. Using this expression to find
the implicit derivative of ’ with respect to -, assuming that D sets a optimally ex post, and
evaluating the result at the base case trade agreement (- = -ORL + aOUA, ’ = 1) gives the














































again, in a dampened way.
The introduction of an adjudication phase results, during the post adjudication phase, in
deficient ex post  liberalization - – a and in an excessive action a. Raising ’ above unity
worsens the former problem, since it causes C to liberalize less ex post, but lessens the latter
problem. Weak deterrence implies that the first effect will be predominant, so that ’ should
be reduced; strong deterrence implies the reverse.
The result, though, is an emphasis on commensurate punishment. This is preserved with
uniform deterrence. Strong or weak deterrence produces deviations in the punishment factor
’, but they are dampened in the sense that punishments a’ change less than - itself.
The argument thus far in this section assumes that D will violate the DSP ruling and that
C will punish. This is necessarily so in the base case, where the two countries will negotiate
a trade agreement that guarantees violation. If the adjudication phase is not too important to
the two governments relative to the post-adjudication phase (i.e., if ￿ is small enough), the
trade agreement will be close enough to that of the base case still to guarantee violation. But
large values of ￿ require that the possibility of D abiding by the DSP ruling be considered. I
turn to this next. To summarize results thus far,
Proposition 4  For sufficiently small positive ￿, the two governments will negotiate a
trade agreement in which - < -ORL + aOUA and ’ approximates unity. This will induce
D to violate the DSP ruling.:LOIUHG -￿ (WKLHU 3DJH ￿￿
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Raising ￿ above zero causes D to set aJ > aOUA > a, and it also causes C to experience
“excessive” liberalization during the adjudication phase and deficient liberalization during
the post-adjudication phase. The trade agreement induces D to adjust its action closer to aOUA
in each phase, enhancing the non-trade effects of the action, and it smooths out the variation
of liberalization experienced by C.
The pure adjudication case
Consider now what the negotiated trade agreement would be if the negotiators gave no
weight at all to the post-adjudication phase, that is, if ￿ = 1. This can be thought of as the
polar opposite to the base case, where ￿ = 0. With ￿ = 1, the magnitude of the punishment
coefficient ’ is immaterial, so nothing is lost by setting it equal to unity.
The joint welfare of C and D equals
The first-order ex ante optimality condition that - be chosen to maximize WJ, taking into
account that D will subsequently choose aJ optimally, reduces to
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If ￿￿ is sufficiently small, this condition implies that - > -ORL > - – aJ. This in turn implies
that  which, for sufficiently small ￿￿, requires  so that () () , 1 +-< gt
g g ar J ( ) ¢> l a J 0,
aJ < aOUA. Conversely, if ￿￿ is sufficiently large, the first-order condition implies that -ORL >
- > - – aJ, whence aJ > aOUA for ￿￿ sufficiently large.
Proposition 5  If terms of trade effects are sufficiently unimportant to the negotiators,
a pure-adjudication-case trade agreement will result in D experiencing deficient
liberalization and C excessive liberalization and in D choosing a level of the trade
related action below the optimal unilateral level. Sufficiently important terms of trade
effects result in both countries experiencing deficient liberalization and in D choosing
a level of the trade related action above the optimal unilateral level.3XQLVKPHQWV DQG ’LVSXWH 6HWWOHPHQW LQ 7UDGH $JUHHPHQWV 3DJH ￿￿
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Consider now the choice that D must make at the end of the adjudication phase: whether to
abide (A) by the finding and set a = 0 or to violate (V) the finding and set a equal to some
positive value, knowing that this will induce punishment by C. The choice between the A and
V strategies is independent of what D did during the adjudication process, now past history.
Define V(-, ’) as follows.
where
() () () 11 0 +- - +- + ¢ = gt m e r l
g g ar a () .
D  will violate or abide by the ruling according as V is positive or negative, and
() Va ORL OUA t +> ,. 10
Define W(-, ’) as:
It will be optimal ex ante that whichever country turns out to be D violate or abide by the
ruling according as W is positive or negative. Also,  and () Wa ORL OUA t +> ,1 0
VW a (,) (,) () . ttl 11 1
2 =+
The above discussion of the pure adjudication case implied that, unless ￿￿ is small
enough to prevent it, -J – aJ will be further enough from -ORL than will -J to ensure that
() () [] [] ra a r JJ JJ JJ
g g gg tt t t --- < -
+ + 1 1 .:LOIUHG -￿ (WKLHU 3DJH ￿￿
This in turn implies that  unless ￿(aJ) is large enough to prevent it. That is, () V J t ,1 0 <
unless trade related action is important enough to governments relative to trade concerns—as
measured by  ￿￿—governments would prefer to abide by a negative determination, when the
degree of liberalization is that of the pure adjudication case, rather than to violate it and
experience the rollback of liberalization implied by violation cum commensurate punish-
ment. I refer to this circumstance as the abidement property.
Abidement property ￿￿ is large enough relative to ￿(aJ) so that . () V J t ,1 0 <
The definition of V(-, ’) implies that, when ’ = 1,   and () [] Va t
g g gt t =+ -- > () 10


























which is negative with ￿1 > 0. Accordingly, ( )( ) [] W a ra r
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Figure 1 depicts the plane of possible trade agreements (-, ’). The locus V = 0 bisects the
plane between those agreements that will induce the country that turns out to be D to abide
by or to violate the DSP ruling. The W = 0 locus does the same on the basis of whether it is
ex ante optimal that D abide or violate. Point B denotes the base case agreement and must be
in the violate zone. Point J denotes the pure adjudication agreement with ’ = 1, and, if the
abidement property holds, will be in the abide zone as depicted in the figure.3XQLVKPHQWV DQG ’LVSXWH 6HWWOHPHQW LQ 7UDGH $JUHHPHQWV 3DJH ￿￿
The ex ante optimal trade agreement is B if ￿ = 0 and J if ￿ = 1. Intermediate values of ￿
imply other agreements, possibilities illustrated by the bold line in figure 1. Small values of
￿ yield agreements that will induce D to violate the DSP ruling. As discussed above, these
agreements will feature commensurate punishment if deterrence is uniform, or dampened
departures from commensurate punishment otherwise. If the abidement property holds, large
values of ￿ yield agreements that will induce D to abide by the ruling, and commensurate
punishment suffices to ensure this.
Yet another possibility is for some range of intermediate values of ￿ to imply agreements
between the V = 0 and W = 0 schedules. In such cases, an optimal agreement requires D to
abide by the DSP ruling, but commensurate punishment would induce D to violate. See
Figure 1. Thus punishment must be more severe than this, with ’ at least large enough to
correspond to points on the V = 0 schedule.:LOIUHG -￿ (WKLHU 3DJH ￿￿
Figure 1 The Trade Agreement Plane3XQLVKPHQWV DQG ’LVSXWH 6HWWOHPHQW LQ 7UDGH $JUHHPHQWV 3DJH ￿￿
The abidement property, however, tends to minimize the importance of such deviations
from commensurate punishment. First, low values of ￿(a) reduce the distance between the
two schedules when ’ = 1, limiting the scope for such outcomes. Second, high values of ￿￿
flatten the V = 0 schedule, limiting the required deviation above ’ = 1.
Proposition 6  If the abidement property holds, there is a presumption that the optimal
trade agreement will feature commensurate punishment, or approximately commen-
surate punishment.
With low values of ￿ the abidement property is irrelevant for commensurate punishment, or
a dampened departure from it, as we saw above. High values of ￿ render the property impor-
tant. Commensurate punishment is one of the two key results of this section. The second is
the delineation of the circumstances under which D will abide by or violate the DSP ruling.
Proposition 7  If the abidement property holds, the optimal trade agreement will
induce D to abide by the DSP ruling when the negotiators attach more importance to
the adjudication phase (large ￿), and to violate it when they attach less importance
(low ￿).
Why low values of ￿ induce violation is clear from the earlier discussion of the base case.
When ￿ is large, so the adjudication phase is important, the negotiators, knowing that they
have no way of preventing D from implementing a during that phase, will negotiate less
liberalization to reduce the incentive for D to set a large a. But when the post adjudication
phase commences, this lower negotiated liberalization will increase the damage of further
backsliding with violation cum commensurate punishment. Thus the agreement should
induce D to abide.
Thus abiding by the DSP during the post adjudication phase is associated with more (not
less) emphasis on the adjudication phase, during which D is free to violate without punish-
ment. This should not be interpreted to mean that high values of ￿ are desirable because they
limit international conflict. Indeed, since the base case is first-best, there is a presumption
that the negotiators would prefer lower values of ￿ and therefore would try to design the
adjudication process so that ￿ is as small as is consistent with the integrity and credibility of
that process. Attempting to do just this was a main objective of the revision of the GATT
DSP undertaken during the Uruguay Round.:LOIUHG -￿ (WKLHU 3DJH ￿￿
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VI.  Beyond the Base Case: The Degree of Trade Relatedness
Thus far I have assumed that the negotiators know beforehand what the degree of trade
relatedness will be, that is, that ￿ assumes its expected value (unity) with certainty. Now this
will be relaxed. It will be convenient to assume that the negotiators are risk neutral with
respect to such uncertainty, and proceed on the basis of the expected value of ￿, reaching the
agreement described above. The problem, then, is to determine how, given this agreement,
ex post behavior will depend upon the realization of ￿.
The timing is as follows. First, the governments negotiate a trade agreement (-, ’). Next,
the identity of D and the magnitude of ￿ are revealed. Then, as above, D chooses aJ, the DSP
rules against D, and D decides whether to abide by or to violate the ruling. The interesting
question is how this decision is influenced by the realization of the degree of trade related-
ness.
Abide or violate redux
When ￿ can deviate from unity, the terms critical for the decision whether to abide or to
violate, and for whether either decision is desirable, become
where
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An increase in ￿ above unity will shift the V = 0 and W = 0 schedules to the right, causing
some trade agreements that would have caused D to violate the DSP ruling (with ￿ = 1) to
instead cause D to abide by the ruling. A reduction of ￿ below unity does the reverse.
Proposition 8   A realization of high trade relatedness (￿ > 1) increases the set of
trade agreements inducing the country that turns out to be D to abide by the DSP
ruling. A realization of low trade relatedness (￿ < 1) reduces the size of that set.
When D decides whether to abide or violate, it weighs the favorable direct effect of violation
against the unfavorable reduction in liberalization implied by violation cum punishment. A
high degree of trade relatedness enhances the second, negative, consideration. This can be
enough to transform a decision to violate into one to abide for agreements close to V = 0,
where the two effects balance out.
Commensurate punishment redux:LOIUHG -￿ (WKLHU 3DJH ￿￿
Negotiators, aware of the possible effects consequent upon the ex post realization of ￿,
might possibly negotiate a different punishment proportion ’ as a result. Suppose, for
example, that the negotiators settle on an agreement to the left of the V = 0 schedule, which
will therefore induce D to abide by the DSP ruling if ￿ attains its expected value of unity.
Consider the effect of altering this agreement by raising ’ above unity.
This alteration will be of no consequence whenever the degree of trade relatedness is
equal to or above its expected value, because D will still abide. If the degree of trade related-
ness turns out below its expected value it could cause the agreement, with ’ = 1, to lie
between the V = 0 and W = 0 schedules, so that D would choose to violate the DSP ruling
even though that would lower the joint welfare of the two governments. If, instead, ’ had
been set above unity by enough, that could induce D to abide by the ruling, a social benefit.
Even if D still violates, the higher ’ would induce a lower a. A final possibility is that the
realized degree of trade relatedness is enough below average so that the trade agreement,
with its higher value of ’, ends up below the W = 0 schedule. In this case, having raised ’
above unity causes it to be even further from its optimal ex post value if deterrence is uni-
form or weak, and this must lower joint welfare. With strong deterrence, the increase in ’
might have moved it either towards or away from its optimal value.
Now suppose instead that the negotiators settle on an agreement to the right of the W = 0
schedule, which will therefore induce D to violate the DSP ruling if ￿ attains its expected
value of unity. In this case, altering the agreement by raising ’ above the level that is opti-
mal when ￿ = 1 must lower joint welfare ex post whenever the realized degree of trade
relatedness is equal to or below its expected value. If ￿ ends up above unity by enough to
leave the agreement between the V = 0 and W = 0 schedules an increase in the negotiated ’
could either raise or lower ex post joint welfare, and it would have no effect should the
realized degree of trade relatedness be sufficient to put the agreement to the left of V = 0.
Note that the abidement property tends to work against the possibility that uncertainty
about ￿ could induce the negotiators to increase ’ when the optimal ex ante agreement lies
above the V = 0 schedule. By reducing the difference between the V = 0 and W = 0 schedules
it lowers, other things equal, the chances that the realization of ￿ will leave the trade agree-
ment between those two schedules. By flattening the V = 0 schedule it lowers the amount by
which increasing ’ could conceivably be beneficial.
All in all, it seems quite unlikely that uncertainty about the degree of trade relatedness
would induce negotiators to increase ’ significantly. But it is possible to construct examples
where this would happen—for example, a magnitude of ￿ implying (when ￿ = 1) a trade
agreement somewhat to the left of the V = 0 schedule combined with a subjective probability
distribution over ￿ giving no likelihood to the realization of low enough degrees of trade
relatedness to leave the negotiated agreement to the right of the W = 0 schedule.3XQLVKPHQWV DQG ’LVSXWH 6HWWOHPHQW LQ 7UDGH $JUHHPHQWV 3DJH ￿￿
VII. Concluding  Remarks
This paper explores the idea that observed dispute settlement procedures and punishments
are responses to the fact that trade agreements are necessarily incomplete contracts. I argue
that this perspective can explain prominent features of these procedures and punishments and
also has implications for the trade agreements themselves. The argument can be summarized
as follows.
0 Trade agreements are of necessity incomplete contracts because trade can be affected by
all sorts of potential policies that countries can either not foresee or not be willing to
negotiate about.
0 If no weight is given to the adjudication phase and if the degree of trade relatedness is
known with certainty, the negotiated trade agreement will induce the defendant to violate
the DSP and will deliver, ex post, both the optimal degree of liberalization and the opti-
mal unilateral action for the defendant.
0 This suggests a central role, in the process of multilateral trade liberalization, for an
implicit agreement to allow countries to violate agreed commitments if the violation
implies no retreat from reciprocity.
0 If the adjudication phase is of concern to the two governments they will negotiate a trade
agreement with less liberalization.
0 The abidement property—that trade matters sufficiently to governments relative to trade
related action—implies a presumption that the optimal trade agreement will feature
commensurate punishment, or approximately commensurate punishment.
0 If the abidement property holds, the optimal trade agreement will induce the defendant to
abide by the DSP ruling when the negotiators attach more importance to the adjudication
phase, and to violate it when they attach less importance.
0 A realization of high trade relatedness increases the set of trade agreements inducing the
country that turns out to be D to abide by the DSP ruling. A realization of low trade
relatedness reduces the size of that set.
A question for future research suggested by the above is: What are the implications of
uncertainty about the direct magnitude on governments’ objective functions of the trade:LOIUHG -￿ (WKLHU 3DJH ￿￿
related actions? The important role of the abidement property (essentially that the trade
consequences of such actions be sufficiently important relative to the direct consequences)
suggests that this is an important question.
This paper has, for concreteness, proceeded with respect to the dispute settlement proce-
dures of the WTO. But the basic stylized facts motivating this analysis have characterized
the entire GATT-WTO period of history. This suggests that the issues raised here are central
to the process of multilateral trade liberalization. It also raises another question for future
research. With the WTO, essential stylized facts of the DSP are enshrined in trade agree-
ments. Before that they were still present but apparently as elements of an “implicit” con-
tract. Does such “implicitness” matter? Or, put another way, does it matter that such stylized
facts are now enshrined in the WTO?3XQLVKPHQWV DQG ’LVSXWH 6HWWOHPHQW LQ 7UDGH $JUHHPHQWV 3DJH ￿￿
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Appendix: Implications of the Adjudication Phase for the Trade
Agreement
The rate of liberalization
The condition (11) that aJ be optimally chosen implies that
Now for small values of ￿￿ the right-hand side of (12) is necessarily negative. The response of
this right-hand side to a change in ￿￿, in light of (17), is just
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